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Essay 
Toward a Political Theory of Police Violence 
KIEL BRENNAN-MARQUEZ 
We are in the midst of a long overdue reevaluation of police violence. To date, 
most conversations have focused on excessive uses of force—a problem of 
dismaying reach, with deep and lurid historical roots. Behind these conversations, 
however, a more fundamental question looms: what justifies police force even when 
it is not excessive? This question lacks a consensus answer; despite the prevalence 
of police violence in our legal order, it turns out we do not have a unified political 
theory to account for such violence. In this Essay, I sketch a number of familiar 
rationales for police violence and show why each—at least in its current 
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Toward a Political Theory of Police Violence 
KIEL BRENNAN-MARQUEZ * 
INTRODUCTION 
The tumult around policing in the United States—the killings, the 
uprisings, the “stand with blue” counter-mobilizations, the efforts toward 
legislative reform—has brought a number of disturbing revelations to light.  
One of the most startling is conceptual: we appear to lack a stable political 
theory of police violence. When the police use force against civilians 
(especially, but not exclusively, lethal force), what authorizes that act? On 
what normative foundation, ultimately, does the enterprise of policing 
come to rest?   
We do not know. And by this, I do not mean simply to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy or wisdom of any particular act of police violence. My goal here 
is not to diagnose cases of police abuse—by contrast to reasonable uses of 
force. It is more fundamental.  I mean to suggest that we lack a clear account 
of what makes even justifiable police violence legitimate; we lack a theory 
of police authority that adequately accounts for the forms of police violence 
to which legal institutions have traditionally lent their blessing. 
I am not saying there can be no legitimate instances of police violence, 
though—consistent with the abolitionist spirit of this Commentary1—I 
would be happy to entertain that possibility.  My primary goal is exploratory.  
In what follows, I examine the three political theories typically on offer in 
discussions of police violence—the “sovereign pedigree” theory, the 
“precursor-to-punishment” theory, and the “line of fire” theory—and I show 
why each fails to carry its burden. The first supplies, at most, a necessary 
but insufficient condition of police authority. The second conflates a claim 
of practical urgency with an argument for authority. And the third, though 
forceful, grounds police authority in the same Hobbesian foundation—an 
inalienable right of self-defense—that grounds civilian authority to use 
force. As such, it fails to explain what makes police authority distinct. 
 
* Associate Professor and William T. Golden Scholar, University of Connecticut School of Law. I 
would like to thank Vincent Chiao, Stephen Henderson, Paul Linden-Retek, and Julia Simon-Kerr for 
helpful feedback on the first version of this Essay.  
1 See, e.g., Jamelia Morgan, Lawyering for Abolitionist Movements, 53 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2021) 
(providing background on abolitionism as a legal and political movement). 
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I. THE “SOVEREIGN PEDIGREE” THEORY 
The first theory—the “sovereign pedigree” theory—reaches back to the 
early days of common law. The idea is simple: enforcement officials, as 
agents of the sovereign, wield authority equivalent to what the sovereign 
could wield directly, absent an agent. In a monarchy, this chain of delegation 
could be imagined literally: what the King could do of his own hand, agents 
of the Crown could likewise do. If the King could demand entry into a 
private home, he could also license—by general warrant—his soldiers to do 
the same. If the King could inflict violence on one of his subjects for failing 
to, say, pay taxes, he could also deputize other officials to do the same. And 
so on. In a democracy, by contrast, the claim is more figurative. There is no 
corporeal sovereign; the people as a whole are sovereign. So, enforcement 
officials, as agents, have to be understood to enjoy an authority that no 
specific human could, in principle, have acted upon directly. But the core 
point holds. A self-governing polity may delegate to specific agents the 
sovereign authority that derives from democratic rule. Indeed, practically 
speaking, it must do so—that is the only way things get done. 
Of course, to say the delegation of sovereign authority may occur in 
principle tells us very little about the “when” and the “how.” In practice, 
determining whether such authority actually has been delegated is 
different—and typically far more complicated—than determining that it is 
the kind of authority that can be delegated at all. The first question has 
spawned complex lines of doctrine in virtually all areas of public law. And 
understandably so: when assessing the legitimacy of official conduct, one 
thing we virtually always want to know is whether it arose from validly 
delegated authority; that is, whether the authority had the right pedigree. 
Was the official actually acting in her capacity as an official—a role bound, 
in the first instance, by sovereign delegation? If not, then the official’s action 
was ultra vires: presumptively unlawful.2   
As political theories of policing go, the problem here is straightforward. 
Sovereign pedigree may be necessary to the legitimacy of police conduct—
violent or otherwise—but it is not sufficient to produce legitimacy.3 In other 
words, to decide if a given act of police violence was permissible, we need 
to know more than simply whether the officer in question complied with 
democratically-enacted positive law. If the act fell short of even this hurdle, 
that alone may make it illegitimate. But democratic delegation, even of the 
most robust and well-functioning variety, can never be the end of the story. 
The reason is the same reason, at bottom, that we have constitutional law at 
 
2 Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2181–88 (2019).  
3 For further background on the proposition that democratic delegation is necessary to the 
legitimacy of policing, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 307 
(2017); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 
1048 (2016). 
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all: majoritarianism is no guarantor of legitimacy. Sometimes, in fact, it is 
precisely the obstacle.4  
Imagine, after all, if a legislature were to enact a statute empowering 
police to physically assault anyone suspected of a crime; so, in addition to 
the usual search-and-seizure powers, police would have the power to directly 
and purposely inflict pain. Would it matter if the democratic pedigree of such 
a statute were pristine? Furthermore, would it matter if, under the statute’s 
terms, “assault authority” were conditioned on probable cause, or even a 
more stringent standard of suspicion? To both questions, the answer is plainly 
no. Subjecting civilians to deliberate suffering based exclusively on the 
judgment of an executive official, with no input from the judiciary—indeed, 
no legal process of any kind—plainly flouts the rule of law. Throughout 
history, of course, many states, in many times and places, have operated like 
this—and some have even had a democratic mandate. But those are not the 
kinds of states on which our political theories should be modeled.  
II. THE “PRECURSOR-TO-PUNISHMENT” THEORY 
Fair enough—one might say—but one goal we know democratic polities 
do legitimately pursue, and which plainly requires the delegation of 
authority to wield violent force, is the assignation, prosecution, and 
punishment of criminal activity. This goal runs into substantive limits, of 
course; some activities, for instance, are constitutionally immune from 
criminalization (e.g., religious worship), and due process requires adherence 
to various procedural requirements in the factual assessment of criminal 
guilt. But putting these limits aside, the fact remains: criminalization and 
punishment—subject to the proper constraints of process—are among the 
goals that democratic polities may authorize officials to carry out. This does 
not mean that everyone will agree about which activities to criminalize, or 
about the proper form and magnitude of punishments for different crimes; 
nor does it preclude abolitionism.5 It simply means that, as a goal for the 
state to pursue, criminal punishment is legitimate—the goal’s wisdom is 
another matter entirely.6 
From this observation, a second political theory unfurls: the idea that 
police derive authority to use force from the precursor role they play in the 
process of criminal punishment. Or to put it more schematically: if (1) it is 
legitimate, in principle, for the state to subject certain activities to criminal 
 
4 Needless to say, I am putting to one side the fact that, in the real world, much police violence has 
not been licensed via democratic delegation. The point is that even if it were so licensed, that alone would 
fail, in principle, to establish its legitimacy.   
5 See generally Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
1781 (2020) (setting out a scholarly and political agenda for police abolitionism).   
6 See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Pregnancy and The New Jane Crow, 53 CONN. L. REV. 543 (2021) 
(making the case for the abolition of various forms of policing that intersect with reproductive autonomy). 
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punishment, and furthermore, if (2) police violence is necessary, in at least 
some cases, to initiate eventual punishment—for example, many accused 
parties would be unwilling in the absence of (threatened) police violence to 
submit to the trial process—then (3) authority for at least some police 
violence is implied by the state’s authority to punish. In the end, this theory, 
too, is about democratic pedigree; it simply imagines the substantive 
criminal law, and the authority to punish that underlies it, as the instrument 
of delegation.7 
But the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Despite the 
prevalence of the idea that authority to punish entails authority to enforce—
which would legitimize police violence, in at least some cases, as a precursor 
to prosecution—there is no necessary connection between the two. As a 
conceptual matter, it is perfectly possible for a legal order to authorize 
deliberately-inflicted state violence only in cases where the subject of 
violence had been convicted, in court, of a crime—and never in cases where 
the subject was simply suspected of a crime. The distinction here is, after 
all, a central pillar of liberal legalism: the presumption of innocence. 
Whatever authority the state may possess to inflict pain and suffering on 
subjects who have been convicted of crimes, it does not possess the same 
authority with respect to presumed-innocent subjects; if it did, the 
presumption would unravel. (And once again, all this is true irrespective of 
one’s view of how criminal punishment ought to be wielded. Even for those 
who would argue against most uses of criminal punishment—even for those 
who would call for elimination of criminal punishment entirely—the state’s 
authority to punish remains intact.) 
In practice, of course, the state often does exercise violence against 
presumed-innocent subjects as a precursor to prosecution. Arrest warrants—
authorizing an otherwise-unjustified interference with liberty—are not just 
pieces of paper, backed up by a threat of opprobrium and non-violent 
sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Rather, they are backed up by a 
threat of force. Resisting arrest can lead to physical restraint, to chokeholds, 
to broken limbs, to death.8  
The question, however, is not whether any of this happens in practice—
it does, routinely. The question is whether this state of affairs is legitimate: 
 
7 For different takes on this notion of delegation, see generally Malcolm Thorburn, Punishment and 
Public Authority, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 7 (Antje du Bois-Pedain, 
Magnus Ulväng & Petter Asp eds., 2017) (arguing that enforcement authority is coextensive with penal 
authority); Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It Wrong to Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342 (2018) 
(arguing that enforcement authority is entailed by penal authority); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Rethinking 
the Relationship Between Punishment and Policing, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 399 (2020) (expressing 
skepticism about the nexus between enforcement authority and penal authority).  
8 See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182 (2017) (exploring 
the ways that extant constitutional law—by taking enforcement authority as given, subject only to 
procedural constraints—licenses police violence); Stephen L. Carter, Law Puts Us All in Same Danger 
as Eric Garner, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2014-12-04/law-puts-us-all-in-same-danger-as-eric-garner.  
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whether a sound political theory underwrites it. On that front, the 
“precursor-to-punishment” theory falls short, because it rests on a conflation 
of urgency and authority. It posits that if initial police violence is necessary 
to bring about an eventual punishment—if punishment would not occur but 
for an act of police violence—then the act is authorized. But why would this 
be? Ultimately, this logic is little more than a form of sophisticated wishful 
thinking; literally, it boils down to the idea that the state’s wish to exercise 
power conjures the corresponding authority into existence. If initial police 
violence is necessary to bring about an eventual punishment, all that really 
tells us is that if the necessary police violence is unauthorized, then 
punishment will not occur.  
This may sound obvious, or like a mere restatement of the first claim. 
But at some level, that is just the point; the first claim, about the necessity 
of police violence to punishment, tells us nothing about the scope of police 
authority. For it to bear that burden, the necessity claim would have to be 
paired with a corollary: that criminal punishment—making sure that viable 
criminal prosecutions go forward—is a normative good of overriding 
priority; a “trump,” to use the lexicon of fundamental rights, though 
repurposed here in the service of permitting, rather than restricting, the 
exercise of state power.   
In any event, if this were true—if criminal punishment were a good of 
trumping importance—it might supply grounds, at least in principle, to draw 
a line from necessity to authority. In cases, for example, of a genuine and 
immanent existential threat, like an enemy plot, there can be a viable 
argument—though not always a winning one—that necessity (of defense) 
implies authority (to use force to defend), because the goal whose 
vindication necessitates force is the precondition of the state’s capacity to 
perform other functions.9 The same is simply not true of criminal 
punishment. If, for want of authorized police violence, some crimes escaped 
prosecution, that would be an outcome just like many governance outcomes: 
a disappointing (to some) cost of legal liberalism.  After all, many crimes do 
escape prosecution today, some because of legal constraints on power, 
others because of practical constraints on capacity—and this is because no 
one, even among defenders of status quo police violence, believes criminal 
punishment is a good of overriding priority.   
On reflection, none of this should come as a surprise. There are, after 
all, many things the state may fervently wish to do—often with the support 
 
9 This is the conceptual origin of the “military necessity” doctrine in international humanitarian 
law. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 796–97 (2010). It also invites a distinction, 
tracing back to Carl Schmitt (no relation to Michael), between “criminal” threats and “enemy” threats. 
When dealing with the latter, claims of necessity can, in principle, get off the ground; not so with the 
former. See Paul W. Kahn, Criminal and Enemy in the Political Imagination, 99 YALE REV. 148, 148 
(2011) (exploring the link between the designation of “enemies” and the notion of an existential threat).   
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of many members of the polity—but that it nevertheless lacks authority to 
carry out. In a liberal legal order, that is a sign of health, not a symptom of 
illness.  
III. THE “LINE OF FIRE” THEORY 
Finally, we turn to the most commonly offered political theory of 
policing—common, perhaps, out of an implicit recognition that the first two 
theories cannot be expected to bear the needed weight.  It goes something 
like this: In the course of their occupation, the police take many risks and 
often find themselves, or at any rate can find themselves, in life-or-death 
situations.10 Accordingly, the thought goes, police should be entitled to 
greater dispensation in matters of violence.11 They should be allowed to do 
things civilians, as well as other officials, would not be permitted to do12—
in the same way soldiers are permitted, on the battlefield, to comport 
themselves in a manner that would be impermissible back home.  
One variant of the “line of fire” theory can be put to rest summarily.  
Namely, it cannot be that a police officer’s decision to voluntarily put 
themself in potential harm’s way is sufficient to confer them greater 
dispensation in matters of violence. Put simply, many officials put 
themselves in potential harm’s way—firefighters, for instance, or state 
hospital workers during a pandemic. But that, by itself, obviously does not 
give these officials greater license to use physical force.  
The more promising variant of the line of fire theory is not about risk to 
safety in general, but about specific threats to the physical well-being of 
officers themselves and civilians in their vicinity. Here, the idea is that 
police, as guardians, should be empowered to use force when dealing with 
assailants. In this case, unlike with the first two theories, the problem is not 
one of substance, but scope. No one thinks the fact that police sometimes 
confront specific threats (to themselves or otherwise) provides blanket 
license to use force. At a maximum, it provides license for use of force in 
the context of a given threat; the authorization is still bound by an imminence 
requirement.13 But if that is true, what distinguishes the greater authority that 
police enjoy, when dealing with imminent physical threats, than the 
equivalent increase in authority that ordinary civilians enjoy? The common 
law has long recognized, and current law (at least in every jurisdiction of 
which I am aware) continues to reflect, justification defenses stemming from 
the existence of imminent threats.14 In other words, when ordinary civilians 
encounter imminent threats, either to themselves or to others, use of force 
 
10 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (2008). 
11 See id. (discussing a justification for “an easing of the imminence requirement” for police use of 
force). 
12 Id. 
13 See generally Harmon, supra note 10. 
14 Id. at 1146–48, 1167. 
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against the assailant is exempt from criminal punishment.15 
There are, of course, limits to justification defenses and the authorization 
they entail. The use of force still must comply, broadly speaking, with the 
requirements of reasonableness. But that is also true of police violence. So 
the question becomes: What distinguishes police authorization to deploy 
force in response to an imminent threat from civilian authorization to do the 
same? One tempting response might be that police are more likely than an 
average civilian to happen upon imminent acts of violence in the world; or 
likewise, that police tend to possess greater skill (and equipment, etc.) to 
contend with such violence, relative to civilians. Yet even supposing these 
empirical claims are true—which is hardly self-evident, given how much 
police work mostly involves sitting behind desks, and how prevalent 
civilian-on-civilian violence can be—it is not clear why distinctions like this 
should make a difference.   
That police are more likely to happen upon imminent acts of violence is 
no reason to afford them more authority in specific cases. In determining 
whether a justification defense applies, the key question is whether the party 
deploying the force had reasonable fear, in context, for their own or 
another’s safety. Why would it make a difference how frequently the party 
encounters dangerous situations as a general matter?16 Nor can expertise or 
armament—or anything else about the relative capability of police to deal 
with violence—make the difference. If enhanced capability sufficed to 
enlarge the sphere of authorization, concerned civilians—or to use the less 
polite term, vigilantes—could vest themselves with greater-than-usual 
license to use force against fellow civilians simply via rigorous training.  
In the end, police officers and their advocates are not wrong to point to 
justification principles—in the criminal-legal sense—as a wellspring of 
legitimacy for particular uses of force. In fact, justification principles do, in 
some circumstances, license police violence. The trouble is that they license 
civilian violence to the same extent. Which is to say, insofar as justification 
principles license police violence, they do so not because the police are 
police, but because the police, even as police, have not ceased to be 
rights-bearing subjects, entitled to defend themselves and others—so long 
as the fear motivating that decision is reasonable.17   
This is the sense, to borrow Alice Ristroph’s formulation, in which 
citizens can be understood to enjoy a “right of resistance”—even against 
 
15 For a rich discussion of justification defenses, both in concept and as applied to police violence, 
see id. at 1146–66. 
16 If anything, it seems more plausible that police familiarity with violence would limit the scope of 
context-specific authorization to use force—at least as a functional matter, if not formally—because they 
would have less cause, on the margins, to claim subjectively-reasonable fear in objectively low-risk situations.   
17 For further background on these themes, see generally Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and 
Culpability, 24 LAW & PHIL. 751 (2005).  
 
704 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:3 
 
justifiable exercises of state power.18 The idea here traces to Hobbes. The 
sovereign, he famously argues, emerges from an agreement among 
citizens—the social contract. But there is also an important flip-side: the 
agreement cannot be expected to consign individuals to violence at the 
state’s hand.  When the state comes for you, bearing arms or other 
implements of death, you cannot be expected to consent, or to relinquish 
your right of self-defense.19 Nor should police be expected to do the 
equivalent. At moments of genuine threat, the state of nature is temporarily 
reproduced, and distinctions of rank and office dissipate; self-defense, as a 
natural right, becomes the organizing norm of conduct.    
But all this raises an important question: if the most promising theory of 
police violence is one that has traditionally been thought to govern 
circumstances in which the social contract has broken down—either because 
the state is radically absent or because the state is the one who poses a 
threat—where are we left?  
Practically speaking, we certainly act as though the police have 
authority above and beyond that of other civilians to defend themselves and 
others. The law adopts labels like “guardian” and “community caretaker,”20 
and part of the dismay that surrounds police violence today—part of what 
seems especially disturbing about police violence gone awry—is the sense 
that a greater sense of responsibility ought to accompany the greater 
authority they wield. But what does this authority consist of? The point of 
this Essay has not been to suggest that no answer is forthcoming; only that, 
at present, a satisfying one is not on offer. Perhaps a variant of either the 
“precursor-to-punishment” theory or the “line of fire” theory could be 
refashioned to deal with the objections elaborated here. Until they are, 
however, the mystery persists. And so does the practical worry that efforts 
to reform or abolish the police—laudable as they may be—will prove 




18 See generally Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 
601 (2009).  
19 See Paul Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship, 56 WM. 
MARY L. REV. 115, 165–66 (2014) (unpacking this Hobbesian idea).  
20  See Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S ___ (2021) (outlining the “community caretaking” exception to 
the warrant requirement).  
